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Abstract
The article traces the post-war history of the British hospital contributory schemes, which
had developed during the inter-war years to the point where, through the accumulation of
small weekly contributions from a mass membership, they provided substantial proportions of
hospital income. A minority of contributory schemes remained in existence post-1948, but their
subsequent development has received little attention. Some evolved into provident associations
offering private health insurance; others remained committed to the provision of low-cost
benefits to a blue-collar clientele, and continued to be known as hospital contributory schemes.
This article outlines the principal features of the contributory schemes’ contemporary history.
We first explore why many schemes decided to continue in existence. The next section uses
national and individual scheme records to delineate the market niche which they captured and
to investigate their role in post-war health provision, relative to the state system. In particular we
trace the decline of convalescent home benefit, and the gradual trend towards a more uniform
benefit package, of which optical and dental grants were the most popular. We then survey
patterns of membership and account for the main trends in support for cash plan products
since 1950. Finally, we ask to what extent the schemes were able to retain their character
as a ‘movement’ with distinctive mutualist and charitable features, particularly in the more
competitive environment of the later twentieth century.
Introduction
Private medical insurance (PMI) in contemporary Britain is commonly under-
stood as the purlieu of the non-profit provident companies, dating back to the
1940s, and the for-profit, commercial insurers which entered the market from
the 1970s (Higgins, 1988: 90–100, 124–139). Less well known are the health cash
plans, which, although they share some characteristics with provident insurers,
differ with respect to membership and benefits. The most obvious similarity
is their common antecedence in the hospital contributory scheme movement,
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which flourished prior to the National Health Service (NHS) (Abel-Smith, 1964:
311–18, 323–337). The purpose of these schemes was to channel subscriptions
to the voluntary hospitals. Some schemes operated on a quasi-insurance basis,
catering to working-class contributors; membership carried no contractual right
to treatment, but it did excuse patients from means-tested charges imposed by
hospitals. Others offered insurance-based pre-payment ‘provident’ arrangements
to those on higher incomes, a development which coincided with the growth
in private pay-beds. At their peak the schemes had enrolled some 10 million
contributors and, when allowance is made for dependants, perhaps some
20 million people were eligible for benefits (Beveridge, 1942: 160) Most schemes
were associated with a single hospital, but a number were organised on a city-
wide basis, raising funds which were pooled and distributed among hospitals.
The largest, the Hospital Saving Association (HSA) based in London, had over
two million contributors.1 Following the establishment of the NHS a minority
of contributory schemes remained in existence. Some chose to cater to middle-
income groups who wished to insure for private consultations and in-patient
accommodation: 17 such schemes amalgamated in 1947 as the British United
Provident Association (BUPA) (Higgins, 1988: 30). Others remained committed
to the provision of low-cost benefits to a blue-collar clientele, and continued to
be known as hospital contributory schemes. The development since 1948 of these
latter associations, now dubbed ‘health cash plans’ (HCPs), is the subject of this
article.
Thus far, scholarly interest in the schemes has been limited to their role before
the NHS, demonstrating the part they played in rescuing voluntary hospital
finances and their role in altering the hierarchical structure of management by
securing places for scheme representatives on hospital boards (Cherry, 1992, 1996,
1997; Gorsky et al., 2002). However, most accounts of the coming of the NHS
accord them barely a mention, while analyses of PMI typically make only glancing
references to them (Webster, 2002: 31, 36, 46–47; Honigsbaum, 1989: 159–160,
Calnan et al., 1993: 28; Maynard, 1982: 140–141). Although this disregard reflects the
small scale of the schemes’ economic activity in comparison to PMI (HCP income
c. £400 million, PMI £2.9 billion, Laing and Buisson, 2003), it is in some respects
surprising. First, their scale is quite significant: during the 1950s the continuing
schemes claimed some three million subscribers, a figure which was only reached
by the provident insurers in 1989 (Office of Health Economics, 1995: table 2.2),
and, numerically, cash plan membership is comparable to PMI coverage. Second,
although post-war governments have remained committed to an NHS principally
financed by general taxation, discussion of the potential benefits of an insurance
model has periodically recurred (Seldon, 1968). Currently, there are continuing
signs of New Labour’s willingness to explore co-payments in the public sector
(Blair, 2003; Mayo and Moore, 2002), as well as debate about the potential of
locally organised, non-profit ‘Supplementary Mutual Funds’, on the model of the
cash plans (Keen et al., 2001: 217–220). Third, policy analysts look increasingly to
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new forms of economic and social governance in which the third sector is used
to deliver welfare services (Hirst, 1994, 1999; see the response by Stears, 1999).
This involves exploration of the potential of voluntary and mutual associations
(Deakin, 2001; Kendall, 2003). Important recent developments in the NHS draw
explicitly on a historical rhetoric: thus the new NHS foundation trusts are said to
be ‘modelled on co-operative and mutualist traditions’ (Department of Health,
2003a), though the empirical justification of this ‘new mutualism’ in hospital
governance rests not on studies of the earlier hospital contributory schemes
themselves but on other businesses and associations (Department of Health,
2003b: 7–10; see, however, Mutuo, 2002).
Against this background of a search for organisational reform which may
offer new opportunities for the surviving cash plans, we outline some funda-
mental features of the contributory schemes’ post-1948history and contemporary
development. The first section asks why many schemes decided to continue
in existence. The next section uses national and individual scheme records to
delineate the market niche which they captured, and to assess whether their role
has been essentially complementary or supplementary to the NHS (Mossialos and
Thomson, 2002: 24–25). We then survey patterns of membership and account
for the main trends in support for cash plan products since 1950. Finally, we ask
to what extent the schemes were able to retain their character as a ‘movement’
with distinctive mutualist and charitable features. The main sources are the
records of the representative body, the British Hospitals Contributory Schemes
Association (1948) (BHCSA), known since 1988 as the British Health Care
Association (BHCA), and the archives of schemes of varying sizes, in Sheffield,
Leeds, Liverpool, Birmingham, Bolton, Bristol and Wolverhampton.
Continuation under the NHS
By financing hospitals from direct taxation, the nationalisation of the hospitals
might appear to have removed the raison d’eˆtre of the contributory schemes.
Although some 200 folded after 1948, 35 continued to operate, mostly those which
had been independent of the local voluntary hospital, with a Board of Trustees or
registered under the Companies Act (Page, 1949: 30).2 Some of these schemes still
operate today as health cash plans, albeit fewer than in the 1970s when there were
32 affiliated to the BHCSA, as against 17 today (Palliser et al., 1984; BHCA, 2003).
Indeed, when the national picture of continuing membership became clear in
1950, the schemes could claim some 3.4 million contributors, a figure which may
be compared to the 56,000who subscribed to the early provident health insurance
plans (Higgins, 1988: 47).3 Given that the majority of pre-1948members had been
workers in the lower-income brackets, this level of support under the NHS may
seem surprising. How is the continuation of the movement to be explained?
Despite the working-class character of the contributory schemes, neither
the Labour government nor the labour movement gave much encouragement
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to their continuation. The Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, enjoined the
BHCSA to ‘(w)atch to see where the shoe pinches first . . . and if the nation
cannot do it, there your voluntary services will be required’.4 This apparently
supportive statement was not backed up with action. Hospitals were instructed
to cease their charitable fund-raising activities and to wind up ‘contributory
schemes run by the hospitals themselves’;5 fears of conflicts of interest led to
the disbarment of committee members of continuing schemes from serving
on Regional Hospital Boards and Hospital Management Committees;6 and
although the administrators of single-hospital schemes were absorbed into the
new service, no place was found for officials of independent schemes, who
faced unemployment without compensation. Furthermore, some trades councils
opposed plans for continuation; reasons included suspicions that the schemes
undermined Labour’s goal of universalism, objections to continued deductions
from pay packets, and a belief that the main motivation was the protection of the
jobs of existing scheme officials.7
Against these countervailing pressures, four key factors underpinned the
desire to continue. First was the practical reality: here were associations with
considerable assets, including the skills of their volunteers and paid employees,
their accumulated capital, and their property, principally in the form of
convalescent homes. Second, at the ideological level there was a commitment to
‘perpetuating the great tradition of voluntary service’ under the welfare state.8 ‘It
is democracy at work’, argued the Merseyside Hospital Council, appealing to ‘the
sense of real sportsmanship, to the desire for self help and to the sound moral
outlook of the average British citizen’.9 Third, many schemes were ingrained
features of civic life and workplace culture, with most members subscribing
through their firm’s payroll (Cherry, 2000). Fourth, although there are no survey
data from the early NHS period to confirm this, it seems certain that members
must have perceived as valuable the benefits which the schemes offered. Thus in
Merseyside for example, despite vocal opposition from the local trades council,
some 267,500 remained in the continuing scheme by 1950 (compared to 388,000
in 1946) and this number had grown to 355,000 by 1957.10 Above all, then, the
schemes tapped a consumer demand.
Where did the shoe pinch? The development of a market niche
The implication of Bevan’s quote was that the parameters of the post-1948
development of the schemes would be set by the activities of the NHS. What
trends can be discerned in the take-up of the benefits provided by the schemes? No
comprehensive time series of benefits is available from the central BHCSA archive,
so instead it is necessary to examine the records of individual schemes.11 A full
sequence detailing benefit claims survives for the Leeds Hospital Fund (Figure 1),
which, with 160,000–220,000 members for much of this period, is reasonably
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Apr 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
mutualism in british health care after 1948 451
1950
0
20
40
60
80
100
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Sickness: hospital
Sickness: home
Optical
Dental
Specialists consultations
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f C
la
im
s
Convalescence
Maternity
Physiotherapy
Miscellaneous
Figure 1. Main categories of claims made by members of Leeds Hospital Fund, 1949–1997.
typical.12 Initially, claims were mainly for accommodation in the scheme’s
convalescent homes, along with limited grants towards specialists’ consultations,
and two benefits which were soon dropped: grants for chiropody and surgical
appliances. Here such items are grouped in the ‘miscellaneous’ category, which
also included provision of home helps and surgical appliances. However, by the
early 1950s three key benefits had emerged: a cash payment while members were
hospitalised, and grants towards the costs of spectacles and dental care. Then,
from the 1960s a cash payment for members sick at home was introduced. The
most striking long-run trends were the consistent importance of the hospital
benefit, the marginal significance of convalescence and the growing attraction
of the dental and optical grants, which from the early 1950s accounted for some
50 per cent of all claims. Note that because of the small size of optical/dental
claims, a graph of expenditure would show that hospital cash benefits accounted
for a much higher proportion (sometimes over 50 per cent) of benefits
paid.
Other scheme records present regional variants of this picture, depending
on the timing of the introduction of new benefits. For example, the Merseyside
scheme did not introduce optical and dental benefits until several years after the
institution of NHS charges, while the Birmingham and Sheffield schemes offered
only convalescent home accommodation in the early phase of continuation. By
the late 1960s, however, the hospital grant was the most popular benefit in cash
terms, with the growth of optical and dental expenditure taking off from the
late 1970s. Other schemes also conformed to this general pattern, and regional
variation gave way to greater uniformity by the 1980s.13
The contributory scheme/cash plan market has therefore been essentially
complementary to the NHS from the outset, in that it provides a range of
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benefits which fall outside the state scheme. Only the grants towards specialist
consultations can be deemed supplementary, and similar to PMI, in that they
allowed claimants to purchase a service they might otherwise have received free
from the NHS. This benefit, however, has not been a very large component of
expenditure, since it typically offered only a proportion of the consultation fee,
and was hedged around with restrictions. In Leeds, for example, such grants paid
up to two guineas per consultation but could be claimed only once in a year, while
in Wolverhampton, they paid only 50 per cent of the fee, up to £3 per annum.14
They were also frowned upon by the BHCSA leadership, which believed they
were ‘aiding and abetting queue jumping’.15
Beyond this, the schemes colonised areas which were excluded from the
ambit of the NHS. Convalescent homes had multiplied during the early twentieth
century. They were either affiliated to voluntary hospitals, which used them to
prevent bed-blocking, or operated by associations such as trade unions, friendly
societies and contributory schemes, which offered accommodation as a welfare
benefit. In 1948 government decided to ‘disclaim’ some 230 hospitals which were
deemed surplus to the requirements of the NHS, including many convalescent
homes (Higgins, 1988: 32). Continuing schemes were therefore able to offer this
additional benefit, either in their own institutions or through meeting the fees
charged by independent homes. Popular locations for convalescent institutions
were in rural areas or coastal resorts thought to be conducive to recuperation. A
medical recommendation was necessary to claim the benefit, which might also
include travel expenses and pocket money.
By contrast, the hospital cash grants were a new product, developed on the
premise that, despite the universal national insurance ushered in by the welfare
state, an episode of sickness was still likely to entail a loss of earnings. They also
echoed earlier traditions of friendly societies’ sickness pay, and their founder was
a friendly society activist (Wren, 1985: 5, 13). BHCSA discussion documents in the
late 1940s had promoted the cash grant idea, and, by 1952, 22 out of 27 affiliated
schemes operated it.16
The dental and optical grants responded more clearly to consumer demand
in an area where, from the outset, government had allowed some scope for patient
charges. These were initially intended to be for repairs and replacements, though
in 1951 charges of about half the cost of dentures and for spectacles the full price
of frames and 10s per lens were ushered in (Webster, 1988: 179–180). Having
promoted a repairs benefit since 1948, the BHCSA was well placed to advise their
affiliates on grants towards these new costs.17 In 1951 one of the most prominent
figures in the pre-war contributory schemes movement, Sir Alan Anderson of the
Hospital Saving Association, foresaw the opportunities which the imposition of
charges would bring: ‘new needs would arise which were not contemplated when
the health service was formed’.18 Figure 1 suggests a clear association between
changes in NHS charges and patterns of take-up in Leeds, and this was repeated
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elsewhere, with claims for optical benefits rising dramatically in the 1950s, and
those for dental treatment climbing from the 1970s onwards.19 From the late 1970s
optical and dental benefits grew to around 35–40 per cent of the total benefits
paid in Sheffield and Merseyside, and in Leeds, by the late 1980s, as NHS dentistry
declined, dental claims accounted for some 40 per cent of all claims. A recent
survey into the attitudes of present-day contributors to the Bolton and District
Hospital Saturday fund revealed that optical and dental grants are still those
deemed most important by members (Green, 2001: 146).
The growing popularity of optical and dental benefits helps explain why the
incidence of claims steadily increased throughout the post-war period. In the
Leeds Fund, there were typically between 20–30 claims per 100 members in the
1950s, but by the late 1980s the incidence was nearer 90 claims per 100 members,
and recent data indicate that the total number of claims made exceeds the number
of subscribers. This reflects the increasingly small size of the claims and did not
signal a threat to actuarial viability. In Wolverhampton, for example, optical and
dental claims constituted 52 per cent and 25 per cent of all claims in 1960, while
accounting for 14 per cent and 18 per cent respectively of expenditure.20
Another long-run trend discernible in all the schemes surveyed was the
decline of convalescent home benefits. This is best understood in the light of
changing norms of non-acute care, as doctors became less inclined to recommend
institutional convalescence to patients who did not require active nursing or
treatment.21 A Ministry of Health enquiry in 1959questioned the therapeutic value
of what officials described as ‘recuperative holidays’.22 The BHCSA preferred
the epithet ‘traditional convalescence’, although it was frankly acknowledged
that this meant: ‘a recuperative stay in pleasant surroundings . . . the sort of
rest that the more well to do are able to provide for themselves in a suitable
hotel’.23
There is evidence that the ‘seaside holiday’ element of convalescence, rather
than its medicinal aspects, was central to its appeal. Thus the Leeds fund reported
that take-up of its inland homes on the Yorkshire Moors had fallen off in
favour of the coastal institutions, particularly in the winter months.24 Consumer
preferences were also shifting away from the old-fashioned, institutional
atmosphere of the homes.25 In 1966 the Merseyside scheme summarised matters
thus: ‘Changes in social conditions, the advent of the Welfare State, increases
in wage rates, and improved standards of medical diagnosis and treatment
have . . . created different outlooks on convalescence’.26 BHCSA appeals to the
Ministry of Health to open up spare capacity to local authority contracting
for aftercare (and thus to public monies) met with a negative response.27 Thus
without statutory support for a re-orientation of these recuperative facilities,
decline in their utilisation continued apace; convalescence benefit fell as a
percentage of the total distribution of schemes affiliated to the BHCSA from
15 per cent in 1969, to 10 per cent in 1973, to 5 per cent in 1982.28 With it went a vital
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part of the identity of the movement, which to BHCSA leaders had represented
a ‘shop window of our schemes’.29
Recent data demonstrate a continuation of these trends. Of some 6.1 million
claims made in 2002, 3.6million were for dental and optical benefits, averaging £24
and £55 per claim respectively. In cash terms the largest category of benefits was
payments associated with in-patient stays (26 per cent), with dental (21 per cent)
and optical (24 per cent) claims close behind. The number of claims for dental
and optical benefits had increased by 75 per cent compared with 1999. Other than
that the most dramatic increases were in physiotherapy and chiropody, together
representing some 12.5 per cent of benefits paid (Laing and Buisson, 2000, 2003).
These trends indicate, in part, the extent to which dental and optical services are
now a private responsibility, and in part the difficulties of obtaining services such
as physiotherapy on the NHS; certainly the evidence available on the marketing
strategies of the cash plans suggests that they are being marketed (especially to
companies) as occupational health packages which will reduce absence rates and
enhance productivity.30
Membership
Figure 2 shows the membership numbers of contributory schemes/health cash
plans in the era of the NHS, set against the trend in numbers of PMI subscribers.
Estimation of membership data is subject to a margin of error. Since the majority
of contributions continued to come through workplace payroll deductions
rather than individual payments, schemes typically kept no record of the exact
numbers of subscribers. Instead they estimated their membership based on
potentially obsolete records of the size of constituent firms and few thought
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it worth publishing totals in their annual reports. The main source for these
figures is therefore the collated statistics of the BHCSA/BHCA, which itself is an
aggregation of these imprecise estimates.31 Even these do not give the full picture,
as some schemes were not affiliated to the BHCSA, and their membership went
unrecorded after 1966; others suspended their affiliation for parts of the sequence
under review. As the graph shows, however, the numbers not affiliated declined
quite markedly, particularly after the early 1960s when the Birmingham Hospital
Saturday Fund joined the BHCSA. From then on it seems that fewer than one
in ten members was in an unaffiliated fund, and it is reasonable to presume that
these national figures fairly reflect actual trends.32
Two further difficulties with these figures should be noted. First, there is
no national record of the balance between individual subscribers and those
whose membership was by dint of joining a participating firm. Individual scheme
records from the North and Midlands show that firm membership predominated
at first: only about one in ten members was an individual subscriber in the late
1950s.33 BHCSA examination in 1970 broadly confirmed this pattern but noted
that individual membership was unusually high in areas such as Bristol, Exeter,
Hull and Reading.34 In the 1980s the balance began to change, with the Merseyside
fund, for example, drawing about one-third of its income from individuals by
1990. The second aspect which these figures obscure is the varied geography of
contribution. The essentially urban basis of the movement persisted, with rural
areas considered to be ‘difficult and expensive in which to campaign’.35 Nor did
the funds have a genuinely national constituency, with large areas remaining
‘uncovered’, including Scotland, Northern Ireland, the North-East of England
and the far North-West.
With all these caveats in mind, what were the main trends? If non-affiliated
schemes are included, scheme membership rose from a base of about 3.5 million
at the start of the NHS to reach about 4 million in the 1960s. It then entered
a slow decline through the 1970s and 1980s, before stabilising and recovering
slightly in the 1990s. This pattern contrasts vividly with the trend in subscription
to PMI which after slow growth in the post-war period entered a period of rapid
expansion in the last two decades of the century. The forces driving the growth
of private insurance are well known, and include aggressive advertising strategies
which capitalised on disenchantment with the NHS, the advent of American
commercial insurers, and the rising real incomes of social groups most likely to
purchase PMI (Higgins, 1988: chapter 3; Calnan et al., 1993: 2–18; Propper and
Eastwood, 1989: 12–15). Many businesses were prompted to offer employee and
company purchase schemes as perks, either to circumvent incomes policies or to
attract scarce staff in competitive labour markets. Thus there was a strong social
gradient in the distribution of PMI with some 28 per cent of professional and
managerial socio-economic groups reporting that they were covered. There were
also strong regional contrasts (ONS, various dates).
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Quite different factors determined trends in contributory scheme member-
ship, for PMI products were not direct substitutes for cash plans. Three issues
underpinned the rise in scheme take-up in the 1950s: first, the re-establishment
of cordial relations with local trades councils, which overcame opposition to
payroll deductions and encouraged the voluntary work of collectors, both inside
and outside the workplace; second, the success of the schemes in tailoring
benefits packages and subscription levels (on average 31/2d per week in 1956)
to their market; and, third, the imposition of optical and dental charges, which
boosted demand.36 The beginnings of decline in the late 1960s were initially
explained in terms of profile and publicity: ‘are we hiding our light under a
bushel?’ wondered the BHCSA President in 1967.37 By the mid-1970s, though, real
problems were developing. It became harder to replace the ageing, long-serving
volunteer collectors;38 at the same time, strikes, inflation and unemployment
meant that for the BHCSA ‘signals are firmly set at danger’, with ‘factory closures,
and redundancies’ undermining membership in the movement’s heartlands.39
Matters became ‘gloomier still’ at the end of the 1970s, and BHCSA leaders ruefully
contrasted the acceleration of PMI membership with their own performance:
‘what we have to sell is less attractive and our marketing methods are less
efficient’.40 There was a push to raise the schemes’ profile in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, with the engagement of two parliamentary representatives, the
employment of a public relations firm, and the renaming of the national body as
the British Health Care Association, with a full-time Secretary.41 The rebranding
of the schemes as ‘health cash plans’ and a concerted effort to update their
image also aided recovery, as did the restructuring of benefits to include grants
for complementary medical care, though as yet these account for only a small
proportion of benefits paid. Finally, there is some suggestion that the rising tide
of PMI in the 1990s may also have lifted the cash plans. The Family Resources
Survey for 2000–01 estimated that 18 per cent of the population had some form of
health insurance, whether health cash plans or PMI, and that since an estimated
10 per cent of the population had health cash plans and 12.3 per cent had PMI, it
was probable that some 5 per cent subscribed to both products (Family Resources
Survey 2000–01, cited in Orros, 2002: 5). The suggestion, then, is that the greater
visibility of cash plan products promoted by provident and commercial insurers
may now be boosting scheme membership too. Even so, only some 15 per cent
of cash plan policies are company-paid; this contrasts sharply with PMI, where
only approximately one-third of policies are individually paid (Laing and Buisson,
2003), suggesting that the cash plans are a much less important aspect of corporate
welfare than PMI.
Consideration of the whole post-war period points to two further aspects
of the schemes’ constituency which have influenced membership trends. First,
they have retained strong local and urban identities. Local loyalties were vital
to their post-war recovery, and recent research into the relationship between
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a scheme’s town of origin and its brand recognition has suggested that these
remain an important motivator of cash plan purchase (Green, 2001: 194). At
the same time, localism militated against expansion into parts of Britain where
coverage was low. Efforts to establish regional groups to promote the movement
over the whole country got underway in the 1960s and initially made some
headway in the Midlands, the South West, Yorkshire and the North-West (the
latter group continuing to meet into the 1990s).42 However, none of these
groups was located in the regions identified as areas on which recruitment
efforts might be targeted (see above). Also, some schemes underwent renaming
exercises designed to loosen their identification with a particular place and to
broaden their geographical appeal: thus the Sheffield fund became the Westfield
Contributory Health Scheme in 1974, while the Wolverhampton scheme became
simply the Patients Aid Association.43 However, just as in the 1930s, an element
of parochialism and a jealous regard of local control militated against such
initiatives. As a representative of the Bolton fund put it in 1965: ‘My committee
will not join in any regionalisation whatsoever . . . We are a local body’.44
Second, although we have no firm data on their social composition, it
seems fairly clear that the cash plans have continued to restrict their appeal to a
lower-income group than that reached by PMI. Labour movement ties remained
important throughout the period. For example, when the Leeds fund attempted
in 1965 to recruit members at a shipbuilding firm in Sunderland, it found that
the employees were more receptive to approaches made ‘through the trade union
side’ than through management.45 Trade union support has remained important:
for example, Medicash (the Merseyside scheme) currently operates a ‘Unison
Endorsed’ health cash plan.46 Has this been a help or a hindrance? It seems likely
that just as the movement’s localism constrained geographical expansion, so its
rootedness in the culture of workplace association circumscribed its social appeal.
The dilemma was nicely captured in this letter from a Cornish member to the
Secretary of the BHCSA; he noted that membership of the main private health
insurance schemes:
can be boasted of in the clubhouse after 18 holes. [However] Flashing your contributory scheme
membership card would probably get you drummed out of the club. Sadly our image just hasn’t
been updated: we are still a cloth cap and muffler set up. We are working class and there is
nothing wrong with that, but unlike years ago there is no longer any pride in being working
class.47
In this reading, then, a low national profile, a localist and socially restricted
constituency, reliance on a substantial input of voluntary effort, and an outmoded
image emerge as the most plausible explanations for the difficulties experienced
by cash plans in reinvigorating their membership in the late-twentieth-century.
Recent trends have therefore seen a different approach. Marketing of the
plans to companies now emphasises the complementarity between the plans and
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PMI, with firms offering PMI to senior staff and making cash plans available to a
broader spectrum of their workforce. The marginal cost of adding HCP coverage
to a private medical insurance policy is not large. And the largest scheme, the HSA,
has dropped the title ‘cash plans’ in favour of the term ‘everyday health plans’;48
one inference is that certain health-related expenditures are seen as an everyday
occurrence or risk as they are no longer borne by the state. These marketing
strategies – occupational welfare and coverage of out-of-pocket expenses – are
essentially consumerist and self-interested, and they raise the question of whether
the ‘movement’ can continue to adhere to its original character.
The mutual aid ethos in the post-war period
It is perhaps no surprise that the contributory schemes/cash plans lacked a
conventional commercial instinct, given their idiosyncratic structure and ethos.
The continuing organisations retained many features of their predecessors. They
were non-profit organisations and, unlike private insurers, they did not challenge
the principle of a collective risk pool embodied in the NHS, nor did they seek
to offer a superior alternative. At the outset they also considered themselves as
much charities as insurance providers, and regarded themselves as a ‘movement’,
acting in concert rather than competition with each other. Here we assess the
extent to which the schemes were able to retain aspects of their mutualist origins.
For government and for financial regulatory bodies, there is confusion about
the status and identity of the schemes: are they primarily insurance companies
or are they community-based voluntary organisations with strong charitable
features? The charitable origins of cash plans are indisputable as they lie in the
collection of funds for voluntary hospitals, and although pre-NHS contributors
almost certainly viewed scheme membership as a form of insurance, the schemes
persisted in presenting themselves as charities, not least because if contributions
were treated as ‘gifts’ to the hospital they were not liable for taxation (Gorsky et al.,
forthcoming). On the establishment of the NHS, the BHCSA leadership was quick
to argue for retention of charitable status, and in fact this legitimately reflected
the activity of the majority of schemes, which established new procedures for
giving to local hospitals, either from assets or by setting aside a proportion of
contributions for philanthropic purposes. The BHCSA’s claim was accepted by
the Treasury, allowing schemes to receive repayment of income tax on proceeds of
their investment income. However, under the Charities Act of 1960, the schemes’
status as charities was removed, prompting several to establish separate Charitable
Trusts through which their giving was channelled and which were still liable for
tax relief (Palliser et al., 1984: 20–23). Some were also permitted to finance their
convalescent homes through charitable trusts, thus retaining some tax benefits
for members. In 1967 they were classified for the first time in law as insurance
companies under the Insurance Companies Act.49 The warning issued that same
year by the BHCSA secretary, John Dodd, that the schemes were ‘in danger of
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Apr 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
mutualism in british health care after 1948 459
becoming cash mutual insurance societies, rather than voluntary social service
organisations’ embodies the movement’s own uncertainty about its identity, at a
time when lawmakers sought clarity.50
What did the schemes’ charitable work mean in practice? The NHS Act had
restricted charitable effort in the NHS to the provision of amenities and comforts
for hospital staff and patients and to the furtherance of medical education (Mohan
and Gorsky, 2001: 91–95). Examples of amenities provided by Sheffield Hospital
Council in the early phase included radios, pianos and 24 televisions in time
for the Coronation in 1952.51 It also attracted the support of volunteers for its
hospital cinema service, and for the wrapping of Christmas presents donated by
the scheme (14,000 such gifts were made in 1966).52 In time, though, the amenities
aspect of charity work gave way to systematic donation of grants to health and
social service organisations and the provision of equipment to hospitals (Palliser
et al., 1984: 10).
The extent to which the volume of this charitable activity has altered over
time is hard to gauge at a national level. One estimate was that from 1948 to
1983 the movement gave £7.4 million pounds in charitable gifts (Palliser et al.,
1984, 10). However, there have been variations in the relative amounts committed
by the different schemes and not all of them have operated charitable arms:
in 1968 only 18 of the 30 funds affiliated to the BHCSA made charitable gifts
out of contributory or investment income.53 One way to reconstruct trends in
charitable effort is to measure the amounts given annually against overall income
from contributions. Figure 3 does this for four (anonymised) schemes. Charitable
spending was a rather more substantial aspect of the schemes’ work in the early
part of this period, but since the 1970s the amounts committed have settled at
about 3 per cent or less of income, albeit with some variation around this general
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Figure 3. Charitable expenditure as % of contributions, selected hospital contributory schemes,
1949–1991.
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pattern. This is not to deny the importance attached by the schemes to charity
work or to corporate social responsibility, but it does illustrate the distance which
the cash plans have travelled from their ‘voluntary social service’ roots.
Another distinctive aspect of the early continuing schemes was their claim
to be patients’ organisations. On the one hand this involved the retention of
pre-war structures of member participation, whereby branch associations of
contributors elected representatives to scheme management committees, so that
grassroots opinion influenced policy. On the other, it meant the service of scheme
officials on NHS bodies. The role of the schemes as a democratic forum for
patients was undermined by NHS structures. These had removed agreements
for scheme representation on hospital boards, much to the chagrin of pre-
1948 contributors who argued that the NHS ‘makes no attempt to retain as
a social asset the sense of common effort . . . and . . . will destroy the existing
machinery of democratic control of the hospitals’.54 Despite such setbacks, the
BHCSA consistently urged the schemes to develop relationships with hospitals
and health authorities and warned that if they were seen as being concerned
only with the interests of their membership they could not expect to receive a
voice in NHS governance. It was noted that 60 contributory scheme members
were on NHS authorities in 1970.55 Our research suggests, however, that the
elaborate machinery for democratic involvement which characterised the pre-
war period has become a thing of the past. Our contacts with surviving schemes
indicate that voluntary participation, for example by group secretaries, who were
responsible for collecting subscriptions, has been on the wane for many years.
This has been reflected in a steep decline in the numbers of members and volun-
teers attending annual meetings. The regulatory requirements of the Financial
Services Authority, which treats HCPs as small health insurance companies,
have also prompted reform of corporate governance; by 2001 the Merseyside
scheme recorded that ‘a revised constitution and streamlined board has allowed
Medicash (as it was now known) to become more efficient and capable of making
strategic decisions more quickly’.56 The Sheffield scheme, similarly, introduced a
reform of its committee structures in 1974, at the same time as it renamed itself
the Westfield Contributory Health Scheme. The reason for this was that its orga-
nisational structure was now regarded as ‘clumsy, bureaucratic and inefficient’.57
The contributors’ association, which had existed since 1921, was wound up;
the regional committees in Barnsley, Rotherham and Chesterfield suffered the
same fate, not least because they would be ‘superfluous’ if the new scheme was
loosening its ties to South Yorkshire in a search for new business; and there
was a substantial reduction in the size of the Executive Committee.58 In both
Sheffield and Merseyside, then, the scope for direct involvement of contributors
or members in the operation and governance of the schemes/cash plans had been
reduced.
A third example of the shifting boundary between mutualism and com-
petition is provided by the fate of the so-called ‘gentleman’s agreement’, under
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which schemes agreed not to canvass or advertise in the territory of another
BHCSA-affiliated scheme. It appears to have dated from 1955, when the BHCSA’s
executive committee expressed ‘strong disapproval of competition between
schemes and of disturbance by any other scheme “in possession” in any one
contributing establishment’.59 The self-image was of a movement which had
‘eschewed cut-throat competition’ and ‘had tried to operate on a territorial
basis unlike the provident movement’.60 While PMI and the non-affiliates (such
as The Hospital Saturday Fund in 1970) competed for business nationally, the
gentleman’s agreement was intended to maintain a fraternal spirit between the
funds. Again, this harked back to the era of voluntary hospitals where schemes
operated regionally within the catchment area of each hospital, or group of
hospitals.
This concordat was bound to come under pressure when the need to boost
recruitment made the maintenance of restrictive practices problematic. At the
1969 AGM the BHCSA President deplored restrictions in recruitment imposed
‘by imaginary geographical considerations’,61 and the meeting then terminated
the gentleman’s agreement with a resolution that ‘the more progressive schemes
may develop wherever practicable or desirable without regard to geographical
location after giving due notice to and consultation with any local scheme’.62
This rather half-hearted acceptance of competition only led to further tensions,
as in 1979 when the Worcester scheme complained that the Wolverhampton
association was advertising in its area and canvassing local firms. The president
explained that the terms of the gentleman’s agreement were such that no scheme
‘deliberately poached upon another scheme’s preserve’.63 Thus despite its formal
termination, the spirit of the gentleman’s agreement lingered on, acting as a brake
on full-blooded competition. As late as the 1988 BHCSA AGM, a row developed
over the plans of one of the largest schemes to hold countrywide ‘roadshows’.
Its assertion that EEC competition rules made the gentleman’s agreement
illegal was met with the protest that ‘there was more than legality to consider
within the movement’, although in the event such objections did not carry the
day.64
Consideration of these three areas – charitable giving, democratic structures
and the gentleman’s agreement – therefore suggests that in order to survive it
has been necessary for the schemes to divest themselves of some of the features
of mutualism and voluntarism which had initially set them apart from private
health insurers. Indeed, recent changes in the cash plan sector lend weight to this
view. Various mergers have taken place and some schemes have been absorbed
by larger cash plans, albeit continuing to operate under their historic names.
The trade journal Health Care Market News noted in 2002 that ‘the time for
the smaller funds looks now to have run out’ as a result of competition and the
costs of compliance with regulations imposed by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA).65 The sector is now attracting interest from for-profit commercial cash
plan providers, established in most cases by large general insurance companies
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Apr 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
462 martin gorsky ET AL .
but with some direct involvement by high street retailers. For now, the surviving
contributory schemes still account for over 80 per cent of the market, with HSA
Healthcare (45 per cent) and Westfield accounting between them for 55 per cent
of market share (Laing and Buission, 2003). However, the entry of commercial
organisations may erode their market position, much as was the case when
commercial hospital providers moved into private hospital provision in Britain
in the 1980s, largely at the expense of the undercapitalised charitable hospital
sector.
Conclusions
For over 50 years the contributory schemes/health cash plans have complemented
the services provided by the NHS. They initially conceived of themselves as
carrying forward a tradition of voluntary sector activity, and a residue of
goodwill and habit permitted the continuing schemes to retain and rebuild
membership, helped by the rapid development of an attractive benefit package.
This was founded on the hospital cash grant and optical and dental benefits,
and these eventually came to form the core business of the schemes. The cash
plans remained distinct from provident insurers, due to their philanthropic
work, their representative procedures and their sense that they belonged to a
movement characterised by mutualist rather than competitive values. By the
1970s, however, the ethos of the schemes was under threat. Doubts were voiced
about their public profile, more business-like decision-making arrangements
were adopted, the benefit side assumed greater importance than charitable work,
and the territorial restrictions were gradually loosened. These changes halted the
decline in membership so that by the end of the century, with some 3 million
contributors, the movement enjoyed a similar level of support to that which it
received in the early 1950s. However, the schemes had not succeeded in sharing in
the boom which PMI had experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, and they still sought
a way of tapping significant new markets for their product, while at the same
time competitive pressures were exacerbated by the entry of for-profit insurers
into the cash plan market.
Given these trends, where can we position cash plans in relation to con-
temporary debates about, and developments in the welfare state? Recent social
changes such as rising prosperity, popular perceptions of the quality of public
services, and the rolling-back of the state have led commentators to suggest that
more of a ‘pick and mix’ approach to welfare may figure in the future (Klein
and Millar, 1995). Diversity and consumer choice will be promoted, drawing on
the public, private and non-profit sectors. There might be several reasons why
cash plans would be attractive in this scenario. One reason is related to trends in
the labour market towards self-employment and greater flexibility, which mean
that more social risks are met individually. Cash plans offer protection against
the varied costs associated with illness and would seem rational choices in these
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circumstances. For companies, cash plans are also marketed as ways of minimising
or externalising risks, such as those associated with short-term absences from
work. Such perks may also aid recruitment in tight labour markets.
Recent debates about ‘new mutualism’ and ‘new localism’ in the welfare state
are also pertinent. It is somewhat ironic that this policy discourse has emerged
when some elements of mutualism in health care have largely disappeared. And
within public sector services, it is not clear that consumerism extends much
beyond a desire to maximise individual or family advantage (Needham, 2003).
We do not have evidence on social attitudes to the surviving schemes and therefore
we cannot comment on whether mutuality is important to their individual
subscribers. All we can say is that there appear to be associations between trends
in HCP membership and increased NHS charges, suggesting that decisions to
subscribe are not just driven by rising real incomes but are a response to an
awareness that the state has offloaded some of its former responsibilities.
Given that the major political parties are emphasising the role of choice and
consumerism in health policy, the schemes could be well placed to benefit from
the current transformation of the NHS into a regulated market. The financial
regime under which the new NHS Foundation Trusts will operate gives them
a financial incentive to structure provision so as to minimise the time patients
spend in receipt of free, publicly-funded health care (Pollock et al., 2003). Instead
they will seek to discharge patients swiftly into social or intermediate care settings
where means-tested charges can be levied. This may create additional scope for
insurance products designed to cover the costs of convalescent or domiciliary
nursing care. However, critics point out that that this could also herald the
fragmentation of the NHS into a series of submarkets in which the process of
caring is broken up and commodified (Leys, 2001).
At the same time as the government is opening up opportunities with one
hand, other forms of regulation will affect the future development of the schemes.
A tighter regulatory environment exists than was the case for much of the post-war
era. The advent of the Financial Services Authority, the Financial Ombudsman
and the General Insurance Standards Council has ushered in customer protection
programmes. An emphasis on compliance with regulations is likely to increase the
overheads of these companies and will result in more mergers and ultimately fewer
and larger cash plans. Whether the notion of the ‘Movement’ which has obtained
since the formation of the BHCSA in 1930 will survive into this commercial and
regulated marketplace remains to be seen.
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